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Abstract 
This paper explores the challenges facing the European Union’s “European 
Neighbourhood Policy” and its likely future development. It questions the assumption 
that EU enlargement can continue indefinitely without putting the future functioning 
of the Union and the prospects of closer European integration into question. The 
paper explores how the ENP might be strengthened and made more attractive to the 
EU’s neighbours, including steps to strengthen cooperation between the EU and both 
the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
The author questions whether, even after reform, the ENP can offer an adequate long 
term substitute for those among the EU’s eastern neighbours who aspire to eventual 
Union membership. The fatal flaw in the present ENP is the lack of any multi-lateral 
character to the relationship – placing each ENP partner at a considerable 
negotiating disadvantage in relation to the EU. He examines possible new 
relationships which might be envisaged between a finally enlarged European Union 
and its eastern neighbours – specifically a proposal to build together a “United 
European Commonwealth” (UEC) as a limited sovereignty sharing community. The 
paper also  suggests some possible institutions and decision making processes which 
might enable such a United European Commonwealth to achieve a limited but 
significant degree of integration with those of its eastern neighbour states – including 
Russia – which fulfil stipulated criteria for democracy and the rule of law.   
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1.1 Introduction 
This paper explores some of the critical challenges which lie at the heart of the 
European Union’s “European Neighbourhood Policy” and its likely future 
development. Specifically the paper –  
1) Seeks to stimulate debate about an issue likely to be high on the Union’s 
agenda during and after the 2010/2011 Belgian/Spanish/Hungarian (BSH) 
Team Presidency i.e. the eventual limits of EU enlargement and the 
implications for the EU’s eastern neighbours of the future evolution of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
2) Questions the sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit assumption that EU 
enlargement can continue indefinitely without putting the future functioning of 
the Union and the prospects of closer European integration into question;  
3) Explores how the ENP might be strengthened and made more attractive to the 
EU’s neighbours, including steps to strengthen cooperation between the EU 
and both the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe; 
                                                           
1
 I would like to acknowledge my extensive debt to the work of colleagues who have contributed to 
studies on the future of the ENP – published by the European Policy Centre, Brussels and other 
institutes – from which I have freely drawn for this article. 
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4) Questions whether, even after reform, the ENP can offer an adequate long 
term substitute for those among the EU’s eastern neighbours who aspire to 
eventual Union membership; 
5) Examines possible new relationships which might be envisaged between a 
finally enlarged European Union and its eastern neighbours – specifically a 
proposal to build together a “United European Commonwealth” (UEC) as a 
limited sovereignty sharing community; 
6) Suggests some possible institutions and decision making processes which 
might enable such a United European Commonwealth to achieve a limited but 
significant degree of integration with those of its eastern neighbour states – 
including Russia – which fulfil stipulated criteria for democracy and the rule 
of law. 
   
1.2 Background – EU Enlargement Fatigue 
There is at the time of writing a major question mark over the planned ratification  of 
the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty, following the victory of the “No” campaign in 
the Lisbon Treaty referendum in Ireland. Until the Irish rejection of the treaty, it had 
been assumed that the new treaty would probably come into force by the end of 2009 
or shortly thereafter. It is possible that the Lisbon Treaty (the successor to the aborted 
European Union Constitution) which was painfully negotiated for more than six years 
might now have to be abandoned or re-negotiated and made subject to a further round 
of ratifications or Ireland may hold a second referendum in the early months of 2009 
to reconsider ratification.  
Currently efforts are underway to explore how Irish reservations about the Lisbon 
Treaty might be addressed so that its ratification may be finalised before the next 
direct elections to the European Parliament in June 2009. If the treaty is in force the 
political outcome of the European Parliament election could be decisive for the 
election of the next President of the European Commission. 
  
6 
Until this issue is resolved there will be little enthusiasm among EU Member States to 
actively pursue the goal of further enlargement. One important exception may prove 
to be Croatia whose accession negotiations are already underway and may be 
completed with two years. In this context it seems reasonable to assume that the 
Lisbon Treaty or at least its key components will come into force in the run up to an 
expected accession of Croatia in to 2010 or 2011. 
If and when the Lisbon Treaty is implemented, or the reforms to the EU’s institutions 
and decision making processes are agreed in some other form, the governance of the 
Union will be improved in a number of important areas. However the EU 
commitment in principle to further enlargement beyond the present 27 Member States 
(possibly plus Croatia) will continue to pose challenges both in terms of convincing 
unenthusiastic or even hostile EU public opinion and ensuring the effective 
management of an ever larger and more diverse Union.  
Economic, social and political problems in the existing EU have already combined to 
reduce popular support for the enlargement project itself. This was evidenced in at 
least the secondary role played by possible future enlargement (notably to Turkey) in 
motivating “No” voters during the referendums in France and the Netherlands which 
blocked ratification of the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty. 
Indefinite denial of membership to the applicant states in the Western Balkans and/or 
to Turkey could, however, have potentially serious consequences for progress in 
insuring greater stability and reform in the region. If the applicant states meet the 
criteria for accession, the long standing EU promise “in principle” that they would 
qualify to join the Union should be honoured. This is essential if the European Union 
is to be able to play a serious role in assuring progress towards reconciliation, 
deepening cooperation between regional states as well as fostering economic and 
democratic political evolution in the whole region.2 
Final decisions on this further – and for the foreseeable future - final enlargement to 
the Balkan accession states and Turkey will probably have to be decided in the course 
                                                           
2
 Conclusions of the European Council, December 2007. 
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of the next decade. If, at that point, any additional accessions to the EU are put on 
hold, the European Union’s external borders will, in effect, be formally defined - 
probably for decades to come. 
At this point some awkward questions arise. The establishment of the long term 
borders of the EU must not come to be regarded as a rejection of the “European 
vocation” of those countries in the wider, geographical Europe which still aspire to 
EU membership. This could easily result from the creation of a new de facto 
economic and political “Curtain” dividing western and central Europe from Eastern 
Europe, Russia and the countries of the Caucasus. 
This makes it all the more essential to define an acceptable, alternative long term 
relationship between the EU and its eastern neighbours for whom full EU 
membership will for the foreseeable future be excluded. This paper argues that such a 
relationship would have to be qualitatively closer than that envisaged between the EU 
and its partner states in the European Neighbourhood Policy – even if it does not 
involve full membership of the Union itself. 
During this possibly protracted period, the EU will be increasingly engaged with 
these neighbours through the European Neighbourhood Policy as well as in “pan-
European” bodies such as the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. The question is how that relationship should evolve and 
what final strategic objectives might be set for it in order to fulfil the European 
vocation of the ENP countries. 
This paper focuses on future relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours. The 
aspirations of the EU’s Mediterranean neighbours demand equally pressing but 
different responses from the European Union. The proposal for a Mediterranean 
Union – Barcelona Process (building on the Barcelona Process) is intended to 
strengthen economic relations with the Mediterranean neighbours but without the 
perspective of future EU membership.3  
 
                                                           
3
  Conclusions of the European Council, March 2008. 
  
8 
1.3 Timetables and Milestones for Future EU Enlargement 
Before the moment of decision on Balkan and Turkish enlargement is reached – 
around 2015 – the EU faces a number of other critically important decision making 
rendezvous. These include ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (or an acceptable 
substitute) by no later than the June 2009 European Parliament elections. Without 
treaty ratification (or comparable reform of the EU institutions and decision making 
processes by other means) it is questionable whether there will be any further 
agreement to enlarge the Union – except as regards Croatia.  
The mid-term review of the EU’s financial perspectives should be concluded in the 
course of 2008/9. Budget reform must include further changes to the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Although important details of those reforms remain to be 
negotiated the goal of reform is now widely accepted – even by France. Global 
climate change and the switch to bio-fuels are already posing urgent, new problems of 
food price inflation and even global food shortages. New priorities for EU financial 
support – such as research and development, foreign policy and protection of the 
environment – imply a larger and substantially restructured budget. The newer EU 
Member States will, however, resist a significant reduction in spending on cohesion 
policy to fund these new priorities. Some of the older Member States will seek to 
maintain current limits on EU budget spending. 
By 2014, hopefully, the reform of the Qualified Majority Voting arrangements will 
have come into force, although their full application may be delayed until 2017.4  In 
any event by the early years of the next decade it should be possible to judge what – if 
any - further steps will be needed to strengthen the Union’s common foreign, security 
and defence policies over and above those envisaged in the Reform Treaty. Although 
ad hoc changes to the way the EU functions are still likely (possibly as adjunctions to 
any new accession treaties) it may be prudent to assume that no further major 
institutional reform will be possible for some years to come. 
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 Provision for this eventuality is included in the European Union Lisbon Treaty currently in the 
process of ratification by Member States. 
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A crucial test of the long term stability of the European Union must be the extent to 
which – as a result of the Reform Treaty - European citizens begin to feel that they 
have a more significant voice in shaping the future direction to be taken by the EU. 
An essential first step in this direction (if the Lisbon Treaty is implemented) would be 
for the EU political parties to offer to voters in the 2009 European Parliament election 
a choice of candidates to be President of the European Commission. But this will 
require the European political parties to have the courage to nominate their candidates 
for this post and to campaign for them across the EU. 
On the assumption that the Lisbon Treaty reforms are eventually implemented over 
the next few years, the political focus will move to what seems likely to be regarded 
as final enlargement to include the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey. 
Even so agreements about these accessions are unlikely before the middle of the next 
decade (always excepting Croatia). Moreover they still depend on the applicant states 
successfully concluding accession negotiations with the EU and meeting all the 
essential preconditions for full membership. 
This certainly cannot be taken for granted. There is growing concern throughout the 
EU that countries should not be admitted before they are properly prepared for the 
responsibilities involved. There is a widespread feeling that Bulgaria and Romania 
may have been accepted into EU membership before they were fully ready for 
membership – notably in the area of the rule of law and the effectiveness of their 
judicial systems.5 
 
1.4 Can the EU Enlarge Indefinitely to the East? 
In spite of evidence of “enlargement fatigue” and the unanswered questions about the 
Union’s future governance capacity if the process continues indefinitely, some EU 
leaders suggest that – over time – the European Union should continue to accept new 
members ever further to the east and possibly even to embrace countries around the 
Mediterranean. The British foreign secretary, David Miliband, has said eventual 
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 Gergana Noutcheva (May 2006) Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the EU: Postponement, 
Safeguards and the Rule of Law, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
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enlargement might extend all the way to the Caucasus and even into the Middle East.6 
Indeed, it might be asked, if enlargement should embrace the Caucasus why not 
Central Asian states with important energy reserves?  
Some experts have already sketched out a possible accession timetable over the next 
30 years to include the western Balkan states, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova as 
well as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland in western Europe if they so wish. However 
even this ambitious perspective would still exclude Russia, Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. One commentator has acknowledged formidable problems with this view. 
“It is very difficult but not impossible to envisage an EU with over forty Member 
States. Only by making a success of the current enlargement will the EU be able to 
contemplate future new members.”7 
It is certainly not hard to imagine how enlargement on this scale might weaken and 
eventually undermine the foundations of European integration given its still uncertain 
stage of institutional and political development. Some of the more radical 
enlargement scenarios would certainly risk fragmenting the existing acquis 
communitaire.  
It must also be said that there seems little prospect at present of the existing EU 
member states being willing or able to finance the scale of resource transfers which 
would be necessary if existing common spending policies were extended to a Union 
of 40, 50 or more states. In this context it must be recalled that many of the potential 
new Member States would have per capita incomes which would be just a fraction of 
the EU average.8 
Some politicians – notably in Britain - have argued the merits of a massive and 
continuing enlargement only in terms of extending “European values” (democracy, 
                                                           
6
 British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, (November 2007), Speech to the College of Europe, 
Bruges (http://www.labour.org.uk/david_miliband_speech_college_of_europe 
7
 Dr Fraser Cameron, (2007) The ENP three years on: where from – and where next?, The European 
Policy Centre, Brussels. 
8These issues are dealt with in “European Neighbourhood Policy: Economic Review of EU Neighbour 
Countries by the European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (May 
2006). 
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rule of law etc) to the wider Europe. But others see the attraction of such an open 
ended enlargement precisely as a means of blocking future European integration.9 
Of course in the longer run – say by the middle of this century – the European Union 
may have evolved to such an extent that many of the current objections to wholesale 
enlargement to the east might begin to disappear. But this would still leave a period of 
decades during which important eastern neighbouring countries would be denied full 
integration in the EU without a viable and attractive alternative. The proposal for a 
United European Commonwealth in this paper is designed to bridge the lengthy but 
important period between the EU’s enlargement to the Balkans and possibly Turkey 
and the time when it may have evolved so far that the full accession of all those of its 
eastern neighbours who are interested could become feasible. 
At present there appear to be three broadly possible alternatives to a continuing and 
indefinite process of enlargement after the accession of Turkey and the countries of 
the Balkans. 
1) The indefinite exclusion from full EU membership of eastern neighbouring 
countries which would only be able to participate in the existing European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
2) An offer to some ENP states to take part in a limited number of EU 
institutions and sovereignty sharing decision making. 
3)  The creation of a limited sovereignty-sharing pan-European community 
comprising the EU and those of its eastern neighbours including Russia, 
judged to have met some fundamental political and economic conditions, 
which would be mandated to take decisions collectively over an important but 
limited range of issues of common interest to both the EU and its partners. 
                                                           
9
 The cause of radical and continuing EU enlargement as a way of blocking further European 
integration has not only been argued frequently by some leading British euro-sceptics but also by the 
Czech President Vaclev Klaus notably in his address to Tallinn University of Technology, May 24, 
2006. 
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It is worth examining the first two options in greater detail before examining a 
possible new pan-European institution – such as a United European Commonwealth – 
which would be designed to bring an enlarged EU and the “Wider Europe” into a 
limited sovereignty sharing community. 
Simply “shutting the door” on long term further enlargement – without some credible 
alternative for bringing the eastern neighbours into the “European family” would risk 
a fatal weakening of the “European vocation” of those eastern neighbours. In 
countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, it is not difficult to see how being denied 
eventual EU membership could slow or even reverse the impetus for economic and 
political reform and put at risk continued progress towards democracy and the rule of 
law as well. 
There are other potential dangers which could flow from a de facto re-division of the 
wider European continent. Countries which felt excluded from full participation in a 
European future might well become more vulnerable in a struggle for “spheres of 
influence” in their region between the EU – and more widely “the West” and a more 
nationalistic and assertive Russia. Indeed they may become more susceptible to 
developing an inward looking nationalism of their own. 
There are already some signs in Georgia that uncertainty over eventual EU 
membership may have contributed to recent political instability and even to the recent 
confrontation with Russia over the separatist minded Abkhazian and North Ossetian 
regions.  In the case of Ukraine EU awareness of a certain loss of its influence in Kiev 
may have led to the proposal for a more ambitious “Europe” style agreement - but the 
final destination of Ukraine’s ‘European journey’ remains uncertain.  
The idea that some east European neighbours might be eventually offered “partial” 
EU membership has superficial attractions.10  The proposal would involve these states 
taking part in the decisions of a limited but important number of EU Councils – for 
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 This case has been argued by Charles Grant in Europe’s Blurred Boundaries – Rethink Enlargement 
and Neighbourhood Policies, (March 2006), Centre for European Reform, London. 
 
  
13 
example those responsible for foreign and security policy and even participate in a 
common economic space linking the EU with those countries. 
Such partial or associate Member States would not, however, have access to all the 
EU institutions or those decisions affecting the “acquis communitaire” (the EU’s 
legal corpus of acquired rights and responsibilities), the financial resources and the 
common policies of the Union. It is difficult to see how this “two tier” membership 
system would function in the longer term. How could meaningful “Chinese Walls” 
separate the areas where the associate members have rights and those where they do 
not? The whole arrangement might easily become a source of friction and resentment. 
The eventual outcome might be not a closer, but a more hesitant and fractious, 
relationship between the EU and its closest EU neighbours. 
Sometimes the analogy is drawn with the existing “Enhanced Cooperation” procedure 
within the EU. This allows EU member states to integrate more closely with each 
other – subject to certain conditions and with the approval of the Commission and the 
European Parliament – where other Member States do not wish at that time to 
participate. But this is a form of advanced further integration beyond that involved in 
EU membership not one of lesser integration with fewer rights and obligations. 
Nor is it possible to proceed in this direction without at least considering the question 
of possible future Russian participation. The question mark hanging over the long 
term relationship between the EU and some of its eastern neighbours has also 
complicated already strained relations between the EU and Russia. There is a danger 
of the shared “near abroad” of both the EU and Russia turning into a dangerous zone 
for contested geo-political influence.  
Russia’s recent reversion to more suspicious, nationalistic and authoritarian policies 
has made it more difficult to see the way to a shared European future as envisaged 
after the collapse of communism. But there is also a lack of vision in the European 
Union about a more ambitious long term relationship with Russia which might give 
inspiration if not to the present government then to Russian civil society and those 
struggling for a more democratic Russia. 
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A decade ago there appeared to be genuine – if vague – Russian interest in being a 
full member of the “European family.” 11  Subsequently Russia has rejected 
participation in the ENP in favour of a “Strategic Partnership” with the EU. However 
the current EU/Russia partnership agreement which envisages a number of “shared 
spaces” for important areas of cooperation seems to be going nowhere. In May 2008, 
the EU decided to make another attempt to negotiate a new “Strategic Partnership” 
with Russia but the prospects of an early breakthrough appear bleak given the 
proliferation of disputes between Russia and some of the new EU Member States. 
 
1.5 European Neighbourhood Policy 
The European Union has – since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of 
Communism - been aware of the potential limits to classical EU enlargement and the 
consequential need to develop alternative strategic relationships with countries to the 
east (and within a different context in the Mediterranean region). Perhaps the best 
way to sum up the scope and ambitions of the ENP is in the words of the European 
Commission:12 
“The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004, with the 
objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU 
and our neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of 
all concerned. In this way, it also addresses the strategic objectives set out in the 
December 2003 European Security Strategy.  
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was first outlined in a Commission 
Communication on Wider Europe in March 2003, followed by a more developed 
Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy published in May 2004. This 
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 The period during which the late President Boris Yeltsin spoke out in favour of Russian participation 
the “European Family” and the efforts made to negotiate a close partnership with the EU are dealt with 
by Peter Truscott in his book, Russia First – Breaking with the West, (1997), I.B. Tauris, London. 
12
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Wider Europe 
— Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours 
(March 2003). 
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document sets out in concrete terms how the EU proposes to work more closely with 
these countries. As part of its report on implementation, in December 2006, the 
Commission also made proposals as to how the policy could be further strengthened. 
The EU offers the neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual 
commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good 
governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). While 
promising a deeper political relationship and economic integration, the level of 
ambition of the relationship will depend on the extent to which these values are 
effectively shared. The ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement while it 
does not prejudge how the relationship of ENP partners with the EU may develop in 
future. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's immediate neighbours by 
land or sea – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine. Although Russia is also a neighbour of the EU, its relations are instead 
developed through a Strategic Partnership covering four “common spaces”. 
The central element of the European Neighbourhood Policy is the bilateral ENP 
Action Plans agreed between the EU and each partner. These set out an agenda of 
political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities. 
Implementation of the ENP Action Plans (agreed in 2005 with Israel, Jordan, 
Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine, in 2006 with 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and in 2007 with Egypt and Lebanon) is 
underway.  
The European Council in October 2007 recalled the key principles of the ENP: 
• ENP is a strategy based on partnership and joint ownership to promote 
modernisation and reform. 
• ENP is a single, inclusive, balanced and coherent policy framework. 
• Performance-driven differentiation and tailor-made assistance remain 
essential for EU relations with the neighbouring countries. 
  
16 
• ENP remains distinct from the question of EU membership and does not 
prejudge any possible future developments of partner countries’ relationship 
with the EU.” 
The Commission has established “a Governance Facility, with objective and 
transparent allocation criteria, to better encourage partners’ reforms, and took note of 
the ongoing work to set up a Neighbourhood Investment Fund, which should be fully 
compatible with FEMIP.”  
Among the successes that the European Commission has claimed for the ENP are:  
 business – free trade area set up with Ukraine; 
  migration – first joint EU visa application centre set up in Moldova; 
   fight against crime – training schemes in the Mediterranean countries for 
judges, lawyers and the police – 1000 have already received training; 
 energy – several oil and gas pipelines under development, to link the EU to 
neighbouring countries and make supplies more secure.  
Although increased in recent years, the budget resources the EU and its Member 
States are ready to devote to the ENP fall well short of the political aspirations they 
have for the policy. The European Union – while not formally excluding eventual 
membership for ENP partners – rather sees the ENP as a key policy instrument to 
forge closer ties with its eastern neighbours and– at least by implication – as 
compensation for full accession. The ENP partners – on the other hand – tend to see 
participation in the policy as a necessary but preliminary stage to eventual full 
accession. 
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1.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of the ENP 
1.6.1 Strengths: 
1) The ENP has evolved a modest but important range of instruments for the EU 
designed to encourage the “European” agenda of economic and political 
reform, rule of law, democratisation and stability in ENP partner states. 
Without the ENP, EU influence over the Wider Europe would be significantly 
reduced.  
2) The EU has, consequently, broadened its relations with ENP partner states in 
a range of areas. Overall this has reinforced a sense of the “European 
vocation” of these countries and their peoples.  
3) The ENP relationship with the EU has reinforced domestic pressures for 
internal economic, political and legal reform in many partner countries. 
4) By adopting a studied “ambiguity” to the question of ENP partners eventually 
being considered for accession the EU has at least bought time before an 
unavoidable decision on the final frontiers of the EU itself will have to be 
taken. 
1.6.2 Weaknesses: 
1) Although the integration of the “eastern” and “Mediterranean” dimensions 
within a single ENP strategy has attractions, in practice it compounds the 
political confusion over the fundamental question of eventual EU membership. 
Considerable uncertainty also surrounds the long term goals of the EU’s 
partnership strategy with its Mediterranean partners – something now 
designed to be addressed by the new “Barcelona Process – Union For The 
Mediterranean”. 
2) The self exclusion of Russia from the remit of the ENP adds a potentially 
destabilising element to the future development of EU relations with its ENP 
partners. Friction with Russia over what it sees as its legitimate interests in 
it’s “near abroad” could carry the potential for a dangerous geo-political 
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struggle for influence between the EU and Russia in the Caucasus and 
elsewhere. 
3) By insisting on the purely bi-lateral character of the ENP agreements, eastern 
partner countries are excluded from a real sense of “equality” within the 
wider European family or any effective voice in shaping the terms of their 
collective relationships with the EU. They consequently risk being seen (or 
even seeing themselves) as mere privileged clients of the European Union. 
These factors tend to weaken the very “European vocation” which the ENP is 
designed to encourage. 
4) EU Member States continue to drag their feet on some of the desirable 
improvements to the functioning of the ENP proposed by the Commission – 
such as the introduction of visa free travel for citizens of ENP partner 
countries. 
5) There is still an unnecessary degree of overlap in the functioning of the ENP 
and the mandates long established for pan-European bodies such as the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE).  
 
1.7 Political Priorities for Strengthening the ENP 
The current European Union ENP strategy seeks, in the words of the June 2007 
European Council, to maintain “a balanced approach towards the ENP.”  In this 
respect, the intensity of relations with the EU will depend on the progress individual 
countries achieve in implementing political and economic reforms. But the success 
and credibility of the ENP will largely depend on whether the EU succeeds in moving 
from theory to practice with concrete measures which would more clearly outline 
how the EU envisages the development and future objectives of the ENP. 
The first priority for EU policy- makers and observers must be to prevent the issue of 
neighbourhood policy from slipping down the list of priorities. A policy of drift will 
lead to increasing resentment within the neighbouring states, and will lead more of 
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their governments to conclude that there can be no acceptable alternative to the 
pursuit of membership. Ministers, heads of government, as well as the EU 
institutions, must share responsibility for building closer relations with this unstable 
region. They must also cultivate better relations as a coordinated exercise on behalf of 
the EU, “not as chasses gardées for national ambitions”.13 
Ministerial exchanges, investment of time and resources in raising political attention 
to these neighbouring states, are largely unrewarding in terms of domestic politics. 
Investment of time, resources and attention in the short term is, however, the 
necessary means of avoiding worsening problems in the long term. 
The second priority is to design a framework for economic and political association 
within which these peripheral states can act as effective partners of the EU, rather 
than as dependents. This is a particularly difficult and sensitive objective, given the 
undeniable dominance of the EU as an economic actor within the wider Eurasian and 
Euro-Mediterranean region, and given the weak economic and political structures of 
most neighbouring states. 
The history of Jacques Delors’ initiative for a European Economic Area, designed to 
provide a mutually acceptable alternative to membership for the mostly-neutral states 
of the European Free Trade Area, is instructive. Before the negotiations were 
completed the majority of EFTA governments had decided to apply for full 
membership, concluding that association would leave them in a permanently 
dependent position. 
A European Conference has already been attempted, in an effort to include Turkey in 
political conversations with EU governments as well as candidate states closer to full 
membership. However, lacking as it did any real element of shared decision making, 
this initiative led nowhere. As this paper was being completed the Swedish and Polish 
Governments proposed the creation of a “Multilateral Format” where the 27 EU 
Member States and the six “eastern” ENP partner states might agree on a “deep free 
trade area” and certain other common policies. This could be seen as a step in the 
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direction of an eventual deeper association of the type underlined below for the 
United European Commonwealth. 
EU heads of government have repeatedly declared that they are “determined to avoid 
new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and 
beyond the borders of the Union.” The test of that determination will be whether they 
provide the political support, and the financial resources, to translate that declaration 
into detailed commitments and actions. 
             
1.8 Is the ENP Accession Neutral? 
Formally the ENP is “enlargement-neutral”: it does not automatically prepare 
countries for, nor explicitly rule out, future accession.14  The Mediterranean countries 
are excluded anyway. For the others, as long as the current EU Member States remain 
divided over the scope and timing of the enlargement process, a certain degree of 
uncertainty is inevitable. At present, however, the majority view – not one shared by 
Poland and most other newer Member States - seems to be to halt indefinitely the 
enlargement process when the Western Balkan accession states, maybe with Turkey, 
join sometime in the next decade.  
As time passes the fundamental distinctions between the EU strategy for its Eastern 
and Southern neighbours should become clearer. Greater salience might be given to 
the ENP through implementation of the provisions for economic reform enshrined in 
the Lisbon Treaty. One suggestion is for a combined Commission for the Southern 
Caucasus and the new geopolitical ‘space’ around the Black Sea.  
In budgetary terms, the EU review planned for 2008-09 could well be the occasion to 
develop a more “holistic” approach to ENP strategy since this will certainly involve a 
significant increase in the overall share of funds allocated to ENP. Proposals have 
also been suggested for the “European partners” to have new incentives to align 
themselves to CFSP decisions; gain special access to European Security and Defence 
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Policy bodies and missions; and even participate in relevant EU agencies such as 
Frontex. 15   However these objectives will test to the full the European Union’s 
capacity to balance closer relations with its “European Partners” with the much 
desired objective of a more constructive and collaborative partnership and 
cooperation agreement with Russia.  
 
1.9 The EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement  
Under the terms of the original EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation agreement 
signed at the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to 
reinforce their co-operation by creating in the long term four ‘common spaces’ in the 
framework of the original Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. 
It was decided to create a common economic space; a common space of freedom, 
security and justice; a space of co-operation in the field of external security; as well 
as a space of research and education, including cultural aspects. The Moscow Summit 
in May 2005 adopted a single package of “Road Maps” to act as the short and 
medium-term instruments for the implementation of the four Common Spaces. They 
thereby determined the agenda for co-operation between the EU and Russia for the 
medium-term.  
Common Economic Space - The objective has been to create an open and integrated 
market between the EU and Russia, to bring down barriers to trade and investment 
and promote reforms and competitiveness, based on the principles of non-
discrimination, transparency and good governance. The Potential for cooperation was 
identified in areas of regulatory policy, investment issues, competition, financial 
services, telecommunications, transport, energy, space activities and space launching. 
In practice progress here has been minimal and doubts remain over EU readiness to 
support Russian membership of the World Trade Organisation – partly because of the 
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Russian record of poor corporate governance and partly because of problems over 
energy policy. 
Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice - Visa Facilitation and the 
Readmission Agreements were signed at the EU-Russia Summit on May 25 2006 in 
Sochi. Both the EU and Russia are still in the process of preparing the ratification of 
these agreements. The visa dialogue will continue with a view to establishing a 
mutual visa-free travel regime as a long-term perspective. 
Cooperation on combating terrorism, and other forms of trans-national illegal 
activities such as money laundering, the fight against drugs and trafficking in human 
beings will continue as well as on document security through the introduction of 
biometric features in a range of identification documents. 
EU support for border management and reform of the Russian judiciary system was 
also foreseen. The Justice and Home Affairs Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) 
has agreed to organise clusters of conferences and seminars, bringing together experts 
and practitioners on counter-terrorism, cyber-crime, document security and judicial 
cooperation. There also has been agreement on developing greater cooperation 
between the European Border Agency (FRONTEX) and the Federal Border Security 
Service of Russia, as well as to explore the possibilities of an agreement between 
EUROJUST and the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office. Progress in this “space” to 
date has been modest. 
Common Space on External Security - In theory this Common Space Road Map 
underlines the shared responsibility of the parties for an international order based on 
effective multilateralism, their support for the central role of the UN, and for the 
effectiveness of, in particular, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Work has gone 
on to strengthen cooperation in the five priority areas identified in the Road Map: 
strengthening dialogue and cooperation on the international scene; fight against 
terrorism; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); crisis 
management; and civil protection. But overall it must be counted as a failure so far 
given the seriousness of the differences over regions adjacent to Russian and EU 
borders (notably the ‘frozen conflicts’ in Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh).  
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Common Space on Research, Education, Culture - Building on the long-standing 
relations with Russia through its participation in EU Research and Development 
activities and in particular the Framework Programme for Research and 
Development, the aim is to capitalise on the strength of the EU and Russian research 
communities and promote joint research activities in areas of common interest.    
Overall the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements have – thus far – fallen well 
short of expectations. The sharp change of direction of Russian policy (including 
foreign and security policy) under President Vladimir Putin in a more assertive and 
nationalistic direction has been matched by a drift towards an internally authoritarian 
regime. The EU must accept however that this policy has been electorally popular in 
Russia itself. 
Tensions between the EU and Russia have also been exacerbated by differences over 
energy relations. Russia’s refusal to sign the Energy Charter agreement with the EU, 
its refusal to allow foreign investment in Gazprom in return for increased Gazprom 
investment in western European energy infrastructure and episodic crises between 
Russia and its neighbours - which have led to cuts in energy supplies – have badly 
shaken EU confidence in the direction Russia is taking. 
More recently these tensions have been increased following displays of mutual sabre 
rattling between Russia and Georgia (which is pressing for entry into NATO). These 
developments have made some of the new EU Member States (notably Poland and 
the Baltic States) very hesitant about proposals for a more positive EU strategy 
towards Russia. 
There were hopes that under the new Russian President, Dimitry Medvedev, the basis 
for a new beginning in EU/Russia relations may be possible. But the fact that he has 
appointed Vladimir Putin as his prime minister suggests undue optimism may be 
misplaced. Negotiations for a new, enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
are planned but the prospects for an early breakthrough still seem remote. 
In retrospect there may have been an opportunity to construct a more positive and 
imaginative relationship with Russia in the 1990s. There was even talk in Moscow 
then of Russia “joining the European family.” But global developments – notably the 
impact of Bush Administration “unilateralism” in foreign policy and the weakness of 
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the EU’s own common foreign and security policy – has combined with a sharp turn 
towards more authoritarian and nationalist policies under the Putin government – to 
put EU/Russia relations virtually on ice. 
Given this state of affairs it is difficult to disagree with the conclusion reached by one 
expert on EU/Russia affairs: “Either way, strong or weak, Russia represents a foreign 
policy challenge Europe cannot ignore. Unfortunately, its recent record in dealing 
with Moscow is one of lamentable weakness and division, allowing Russia to dictate 
terms to a block three and a half times its size. With the EU and Russia due to open 
negotiations on a new cooperation and free trade agreement in the summer, there is an 
opportunity to restore balance by setting out a clear choice. 
Russia can be a close and trusted partner if it is prepared to respect the multilateral 
rules and democratic standards it has signed up to. But if it resorts increasingly to 
authoritarian and coercive methods at home and abroad, EU strategy must adapt 
accordingly. 
Terms of access to the single market would be more restricted; Russia would no 
longer be treated as a member of the democratic club and an automatic member of its 
institutions; and concerted efforts would be made to reduce dependence on Russian 
energy. 
One test of EU resolve will be how it handles the issue of the Energy Charter Treaty, 
one of a growing list of binding international instruments Russia is unilaterally 
defying. It would certainly be perverse to sign a generous trade pact with a country 
that is breaking the rules at the European Union’s expense by adopting monopolistic 
policies and using energy supplies as a weapon against its neighbours. If Russia wants 
free trade, then it must honour its promise to build an energy relationship based on 
fair commercial principles instead of power politics. If it wants to secure the right of 
Gazprom to buy up major European energy companies, it must open its own market 
on a reciprocal basis and stop expropriating private investments.”16 
                                                           
16
 David Clark, former advisor to British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, (May 2008), A new Russian 
president gives Europe the chance to get tougher - and closer, May 6, 2008, The Guardian, London. 
 
  
25 
Longer term, however, demographic and internal development trends may favour 
Russia’s “European” orientation and the need in a post Putin period to build a new 
relationship with the EU. In that sense Russia membership of the pan-European 
Commonwealth could be an important incentive for the political reform of Russia.  
The fact remains that – on paper at least – the objectives of the current EU/Russia 
agreement are extraordinarily ambitious. The proposed “common spaces” to be 
achieved cover not only trade, research and development but also “shared legal 
principles”, internal security and (eventually) a possible shared foreign policy. It is 
difficult to see how these commitments could be fully implemented without at least 
some common institutions and joint decision making processes. 
As matters stand Russia does meet not the “values” criteria for the kind of close 
relationship originally hoped for. However there are political forces within Russia 
whose goal remains the achievement of the democratic, rule of law values for their 
country which are fully compatible with the Copenhagen Criteria. 
As this paper was being finalised negotiations on a new EU – Russia agreement were 
getting under way. Whatever the outcome of these negotiations, in the longer term it 
will be important that the EU offers a perspective which encourages Russian 
democrats and reformers and lays the basis for a new pan-European order in which 
Russia can play a full and important role as part of “the European family.” Perhaps 
the scope of the EU/Russia agreement provides some clues as to the possible policy 
content of an eventual “post enlargement” relationship between the European Union 
and its ENP Partners. 
Before this can be examined in any detail it is important to assess the future of those 
pan-European institutions involving the EU and its eastern neighbours which already 
exist and how both the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) might better relate in future to the ENP.  
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1.10 The Council of Europe and the ENP 
The evolution of the European Neighbourhood Policy has been monitored closely 
from the beginning by the Committee of Ministers and by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe.  Particular attention has been paid to the 
potential input and role of the Council of Europe notably in the context of 
establishing benchmarks relating to partner countries’ respect for values that are 
shared with the European Union.  
The Council of Europe regards all the ENP Member States as a priority for its own 
efforts to ensure democratic stability in the region.  In spite of the interface between 
the Council of Europe’s activities and the ENP, the Lisbon Treaty does not include a 
specific article the Council of Europe had proposed calling on the Union to “make 
full use of the Council of Europe and other international organisations of which such 
States are members” in the development of such special relationships.17  
The European Commission expects its European Partners to express their 
commitment to shared values through membership of the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE, ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and that 
they have “committed themselves to adhere to relevant conventions and bodies 
setting high democratic and human rights standards as well as to accept strong and 
legally binding mechanisms to ensure that they comply with human rights 
obligations.” 
As shown by the experience acquired during the enlargement process, the relevant 
Council of Europe instruments and activities provide the EU with objective and 
reliable data for the implementation of the ENP with regard to the European partners, 
notably through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and other 
monitoring mechanisms as well as opinions and advice by the Council of Europe’s 
Venice Commission for Democracy through Law. 
The development of new joint programmes between the European Commission and 
the Council of Europe would also assist these countries to meet the governance 
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standards and democratic values which are shared by the EU and the Council of 
Europe. But if – for the foreseeable future – full EU membership will not be open to 
the “European Partners” does it make sense to restrict them to remaining only 
members of the Council of Europe which offers no real part in the decision making 
arrangements for the governance of the “Wider Europe”?18 
 
1.11 The Impact of the ENP on the OSCE 
Given its priorities, instruments and scope, the ENP is likely to have continuing 
implications, both for the OSCE’s work in relevant countries and for the OSCE-EU 
cooperation. Three aspects deserve particular attention: 
First, the ENP covers many issue areas, which are also priority areas for the OSCE’s 
activities in accordance with the Organization’s mandate and decisions of its 
participating States. Inter alia, those areas include combating terrorism and 
trafficking in human beings, strengthening border management and security, fighting 
money laundering and financial and economic crime, improving the effectiveness of 
public institutions, promoting economic and social development and environmental 
protection. 
Through the work of its field operations, institutions and specialised units in the 
Secretariat, the OSCE is active in all these countries. The Organisation implements a 
number of projects and activities ranging from democratic institution building to 
activities in the political-military dimension, such as the disposal of surplus 
ammunition. 
Secondly, the EU members have agreed that “the ENP should reinforce the EU’s 
contribution to promoting the settlement of regional conflicts.” Since the early 1990s, 
the OSCE has been the main actor in conflict resolution, defining itself as key 
instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-
conflict rehabilitation in its area of responsibility. 
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The OSCE provides a political framework for the settlement of the Trans-Dniestrian 
conflict in Moldova. The OSCE plays an active role in searching for resolution of the 
conflict in South Ossetia and in supporting the United Nations peace-making effort in 
Abkhazia, Georgia. It also established the Minsk Group to facilitate dialogue between 
the parties in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.   
The development of the ENP will not only deepen the level of the EU’s engagement 
with seven non-ENP, OSCE participating States, but could also open new 
opportunities for closer co-operation between the OSCE and the EU in these 
countries. But such co-operation depends on agreement between the two 
organizations and by all 55 participating States, given the Organization’s inclusive 
nature and its consensus-based decision making. Opinions vary within the OSCE on 
future co-operation with the EU: some are concerned with what they see as the OSCE 
becoming “a sub-contractor” of the EU and feel strongly that the activities of the 
OSCE’s missions and field operations should not include work on EU initiatives.19 
It would be desirable for the OSCE to get engaged in the broader process of 
supporting these countries in achieving their goals, including those set in the Action 
Plans with the EU. Such support could be provided through projects (including 
possible joint projects with the EU) and other activities carried out by the 
Organisation’s Institutions, specialised units and especially field operations in these 
countries.  
This could assist host-countries in achieving their domestic goals and international 
commitments, especially given the fact that the OSCE and the EU share the same 
values. The delivery of relevant countries on the fundamental norms and principles of 
the OSCE might become an important element of the EU’s assessment of their 
progress with the Action Plans, leading to the next steps in bilateral relationships. The 
OSCE’s traditional norm-setting experience and monitoring capacities would provide 
an important additional value, while the receiving states might hopefully start viewing 
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the OSCE monitoring as corresponding to their own interests, rather than as 
“interference in domestic affairs” of sovereign states. 
Secondly, the OSCE could take advantage of the expressed EU readiness to increase 
its contribution to the settlement of the existing conflicts in the OSCE area. The 
decade-long efforts by the OSCE to resolve “frozen conflicts” have so far failed to 
produce breakthrough results. Some OSCE participating states have repeatedly 
expressed strong interest in having the EU more actively and closely involved in 
conflict resolution on their territories. Moldova in particular has recently put forward 
a proposal for an EU/OSCE border and customs operation, aimed at contributing to 
addressing the Transdniestria issue. 
As with the Council of Europe, the question remains: is the optimum policy for the 
internal security of pan-Europe best assured by an organisation whose remit 
necessarily excludes all the other economic and political issues which are at the heart 
of the overall relationship between the EU and the rest of Europe? Maybe the time 
has come to consider a rationalisation of the different pan-European organisations. 
 
1.12 Towards a United European Commonwealth 
Whatever the improvements which may be made to the functioning, resources and 
evolution of the ENP, it is likely to always be regarded very much as a “second best” 
option. From the point of view of the Union neighbours the ENP bargain is a rather 
one sided one. The EU deals purely bilaterally with individual countries. This reduces 
the influence they might be able to bring to bear if they were being dealt with as a 
collective. 
The rules and laws governing the future economic and political association between 
the EU and the ENP states will, essentially, be decided unilaterally in Brussels. The 
proposed relationship involves no real element of “shared sovereignty.” Indeed this is 
already the nature of the free trade relationship between the EU and rich Norway: it is 
the Union which takes the decisions which affect the operation of the EEA. 
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So how might the terms of sovereignty sharing and integration be defined for those 
who become members of what I (very provisionally) would describe as a United 
European Commonwealth?20 The foundation for a new limited sovereignty sharing 
community uniting the EU with its European neighbours might as a first step be based 
on the elements of the existing EU/Russia Agreement – the so called shared Four 
Common Spaces (economic, legal, research, security and foreign policy) as the 
foundations for areas of joint, supra-national decision making. 
The global environment, sustainable development and energy security are other 
subjects which might be usefully added. The UEC might also spearhead common 
policies and strategies for the reform of the world governance system and the 
strengthening of multilateralism, democracy and the rule of law. Some already look to 
the EU to set the benchmarks for a reshaped global system. As the “Founding Father” 
of European integration, Jean Monnet, said half a century ago: "The creation of a 
United Europe must be regarded as an essential step towards the creation of a United 
World.”21 
 
1.13 The Objectives for a United European Commonwealth 
To summarise the argument so far: 
1) The eventual accession of the Balkan candidate states – hopefully together 
with Turkey – if conditions are met and membership terms are agreed will 
probably be decided during the course of the next decade. 
2) This will NOT end pressure from the Union’s new eastern neighbours for 
future full membership – starting with Ukraine but probably extending not 
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only to the states in the Caucasus region but conceivably beyond to 
Kazakhstan – an important oil producing country.22 
3) The present ENP – even with the welcome additions and improvements 
proposed by the European Commission and already in part agreed by the 
European Council – will not satisfy this ambition. Unless the EU is ready in 
some sense to move beyond “cooperation” to some sharing of sovereignty 
with its neighbours there will always be the risk not just of regression from 
democratic and economic progress in the “wider Europe” but of the region 
becoming a long term site of political and security conflict with Russia. 
4) The present ENP blurs some essential differences between long term EU 
aspirations in its European neighbourhood and the important partnerships 
which it should develop with its Mediterranean neighbours. It will not be 
possible to pursue a coherent neighbourhood strategy unless ambitious but 
quite distinctive objectives are set for the two relationships. 
5) The present EU-Russia agreement has proved a big disappointment primarily 
– but not exclusively – because of the drift back towards a more nationalist 
and authoritarian strategy in Russia. Future EU policy should be marked by 
two features: 
(a)  A hard headed realism is needed to secure the best working relationship 
with Russia (notably in the field of energy and security) for as long as the 
government in Moscow pursues its current strategy. 
(b)  The EU should be willing to envisage a radically different future of 
significant if still limited shared sovereignty with a democratic Russia keen to 
be a positive and cooperative member of the “European family.” For this 
reason the door should be kept open for future Russian membership of a 
United European Commonwealth. 
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6) The UEC should be envisaged as a framework for the European Union and its 
eastern neighbours to work together and share decision making on an agreed 
range of common policy issues for the next half century. In the very long term 
– when the future structure of global governance and the management of 
global inter-dependence will have become clearer and when the final shape of 
EU integration has been resolved – it might even be possible one day to fully 
integrate the members of the UEC into the European Union. 
7) As part of the preparation for launching the UEC, the reform and further 
strengthening of the ENP must continue. Moreover steps should be taken to 
see how best to rationalise and eventually integrate the work of the Council of 
Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe within 
the UEC. Moreover for those existing members of the Council of Europe who 
might not wish to join the UEC or might not qualify, they could retain the 
terms of their present membership without participating in the enhanced 
decision making envisaged for the new body.  
 
1.14 How Might the Commonwealth Function? 
The United European Commonwealth should define itself in terms of the values it 
shares - including human rights, democracy, rule of law, and respect of minorities. 
The scope for its joint decision making might initially be based on a number of 
“shared spaces” with the EU – including the goal of a full free trade area, energy 
development and security, research and development and an agreed range of 
“common legal principles” (as is envisaged for the existing EU-Russia agreement.) 
Moreover special alleviation of visa regimes might be considered which, while 
protecting EU interests, would allow the UEC partners to take part in European 
social, educational, cultural and political development. 
The development of a common foreign and security policy might begin with much 
closer consultation of UEC partners in the creation and evolution of EU common 
foreign and security policies. A common security system covering anti-terrorist 
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infrastructure, the fight against organised crime, inviolability of external borders 
might eventually evolve into a UEC security and defence strategy. 
It should be noted that in this perspective the UEC would have a (limited) supra-
national character which marks it out from other proposals designed to improve 
cooperation between the EU and its ENP partners. At this stage it is only possible to 
sketch out their potential scope: 
1) The United European Commonwealth should have its own decision making 
and legal institutions. These would have to be based on agreed common legal 
principles (drawn in large measure from the EU experience) and also agreed 
decision making procedures (unanimity or qualified majority) and the 
creation of some kind of political executive to implement decisions. Given the 
legal basis of the UEC’s functioning there would also have to be a parallel 
UEC “Court of Justice” to arbitrate on legal disputes. 
2)  As already noted the EU would be a single integrated partner within the UEC 
institutions. That would imply that a pre-condition for EU intervention within 
the UEC would be a prior internal agreement within the EU itself on what 
policy to pursue within the wider European institution. In this way the 
integrity of the European Union’s own development would better be assured. 
By contrast the creation of a permanent two-tier membership within the EU 
could threaten the Union’s own internal coherence and the prospect of EU 
further integration. 
3) One essential issue would be an agreement on the distribution of voting 
weights within the UEC executive institutions and also representation in a 
UEC Parliamentary assembly representing the very different size of 
populations of potential member states. There clearly would have to be a 
“bias” in the UEC institutional voting system which favoured smaller states 
of the kind which already exists within the EU’s still evolving arrangements 
for distributing voting weights to Member States in the Council of Ministers as 
well as seats in the European Parliament. 
4) Arrangements for agreeing the distribution of voting powers between the 
different EC members – including the EU itself – would also have to evolve 
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over time as the number of countries participating in the EC expanded. A 
crucial phase in its development and hence in its internal institutions and 
decision making processes would be if and when the Russian Federation 
decided to join. 
5) Prior to accession by the Russian Federation it would be essential that the 
non-EU members of the UEC had effective minority blocking rights over 
decisions which might otherwise be imposed unilaterally by the European 
Union. After accession by the Russian Federation – with its large population 
– these voting arrangements might be modulated to assist decision making in 
the way that EU reforms of the voting system have been enacted. 
There is clearly much more work to be done on the legal and procedural 
arrangements necessary for such institutions to function properly. In a first, 
transitional, phase the UEC might merely provide the kind of multilateral 
framework for consultation and decision making by consensus which is 
envisaged in the recent proposals advanced by the Polish and Swedish 
Governments. 
6) Even in this preliminary stage of development there is still a world of 
difference between such a multi-lateral forum for consultation and the present 
purely bilateral arrangements between the EU and individual ENP countries 
which denies them the advantages of deploying a collective voice and 
influence. 
7)  Over time the UEC might gradually subsume the responsibilities of the 
Council of Europe and possibly also of the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe to the extent that a common internal security and 
defence policy emerges. Special arrangements with the UEC could be made 
for states who wish to maintain their existing relationship of cooperation with 
the EU in the Council of the Europe and the OSCE. 
8) Accession to the United European Commonwealth would depend upon prior 
agreement that the applicant state made the agreed criteria for membership 
and its capacity and willingness to implement already agreed common 
policies. 
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9) As already outlined future UEC membership should also be open to accession 
by Russia. But such a development can only realistically be expected to evolve 
over time – possibly over a long time. Other eastern neighbours – such as 
Belarus – do not qualify at present because of their non-compliance with 
basic democratic standards. But as in the case of Russia, the goal of possible 
future membership of the “European family” – through the UEC – could act 
as a source of inspiration and strength for democrats and reformers. 
10) A major focus for the work of the UEC should be the coordination of an 
agreed strategy for strengthening global multilateralism, the reform of 
existing global institutions (such as the United Nations and the “Bretton 
Woods” bodies) and the creation of new institutions for the better regulation 
of globalisation where none exist at present (such as an agency for the 
regulation of migration and the new global labour market and a post-Kyoto 
legally based institution to monitor and enforce action against climate 
change). 
 
1.15  Conclusion 
One obvious objection to this entire approach is that it involves the creation of new 
and potentially powerful European institutions over and on top of those that have 
been developed with such difficulty for the EU itself. The legal and political 
implications of such a step are clearly formidable and they would have to be subject 
to detailed analysis before any formal overtures could be made by the EU to its ENP 
partners. 
However a number of EU Member States anticipate some, possibly many, of the 
neighbourhood states eventually becoming partial members of the EU. The 
institutional and political complications this would involve would be at least as great 
as those implicit in the proposal for a future United European Commonwealth. 
However the political dangers to internal EU integration would be greater as a result 
of seeking to embrace an ever increasing number of eastern neighbours over such a 
vast territory and with such varied economic and political circumstances. 
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The fatal flaw in the current ENP approach is that it essentially reserves all the key 
decisions which affect the neighbours’ relations with the EU to the Union. That is not 
politically sustainable in the longer term.  The lopsided nature of the present 
relationship between the EU and the ENP is further underlined by the EU’s insistence 
on purely bilateral negotiations with each ENP state. This seems equally 
unsustainable in the longer run. 
Some years ago an attempt was made to get round the perception of an overbearing 
EU relationship with the wider Europe through the ill fated “European Conference” 
idea. But the conference clearly had no decision making or real political power. It has 
since atrophied and died. That should send a signal that the EU needs a more 
ambitious but even handed approach if it is to sustain its influence in the European 
neighbourhood in the future. 
Finally the question of an eventual merger of some or all of the UEC partner states 
into the EU itself need not be ruled out for all time. The process will, in all 
probability, take many decades rather than years. However in the meantime it is 
essential that a credible transition – offering real economic and political gains for 
the eastern neighbouring states and especially an equitable stake in joint decision 
making – should be offered by the European Union. 
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